


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UNITY AGREEMENT OPENS UP HOPEFUL PROSPECT FOR CHINA

THE Chinese New Year, which begins later than our own, beneath the watchful eyes of swaying dragons and to the sound of exploding firecrackers, today finds China at peace for the first time in several decades. The Japanese have been beaten, the warlords are silent, and the forces of the Kuomintang and the Communists have ceased fire under an armistice which it is now the task of the Chinese people to make permanent. The possibility that the truce will actually be a lasting one has, in fact, become brighter since January 31, when the Political Consultation Conference in Chungking issued a far-reaching unity agreement drawn up by representatives of the main elements in Chinese political life: the Kuomintang, Communists, Democratic League, and various liberal and non-partisan figures.

DEMOCRATIC VICTORY. The contents of the accord are complex, and some questions about the apportionment of governmental posts among the several parties must still be settled. But the main feature of the agreement is that it represents a substantial victory for the idea of democracy and unity in China's national life by providing for the creation of a transitional coalition government at an early date; its later replacement by a wholly constitutional administration, the reorganization and nationalization of China's party armies, and the separation of military and political affairs. It also contains a highly significant "program for peaceful national reconstruction," guaranteeing civil liberties, expressing friendship toward the United States, the Soviet Union and other countries, and announcing plans for agrarian, industrial and educational reforms.

The agreement embodies the view of the Communists and the liberal Democratic League that a coalition government should be created as a prelude to military unification. Its clauses on the powers of

the provinces also seem to assure the Communists that their local administrations will not be destroyed, although they will have to be coordinated with a national administration. Various other provisions for modification of the Kuomintang-proposed Draft Constitution alter that document considerably, incorporating in it for the first time the outline of a genuine parliament and creating the possibility that it will contain unqualified guarantees of civil liberties.

It should not be thought, however, that the new pact simply contains concessions by the Kuomintang, for the voting arrangements and numerical representation of the parties in various parts of the government—including the State Council, which is to be the main organ of the temporary pre-constitutional régime—all favor the Kuomintang. The Communists had originally proposed that the Kuomintang have no more than one-third of the seats in the State Council, but the actual figure will be one-half, with the rest distributed among various non-Kuomintang groups and individuals. The Kuomintang is also favored under the arrangements for nationalization of the armed forces, since its troops are to be reduced to 90 divisions and the Communist forces to 20 divisions, preparatory to consolidation.

MANY OBSTACLES REMAIN. The unity agreement, of course, is still no more than a document, with innumerable obstacles in the way of its fulfillment, but even as a verbal accord it goes beyond previous understandings between the Kuomintang and the Communists in that the two parties for the first time have agreed to share power in a united national government. It is worth recalling that the first Kuomintang-Communist united front of 1924-27 broke down precisely at the point when power had to be shared on a national scale, and that in the second period of unity, during the recent war with

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Japan, Chungking and Yenan maintained separate governments, armies and territories. The present accord therefore represents an attempt to carry China to a higher level of unified development than it has hitherto reached. If successful, it will initiate an entirely new stage in China's national life.

The fact that the agreement has an immediate political significance is indicated by reports from Chungking that extreme Right-wing elements in the Kuomintang are expressing dissatisfaction. It is also noteworthy that independent newspapers in the Chinese capital, encouraged by the government's pledges of democracy and by the development of a freer intellectual atmosphere, are beginning to express themselves more outspokenly than heretofore. One of the promising developments of recent weeks has been the strengthening of the position of China's liberal groups, which may be expected to grow considerably if the country really enters a period of coalition government and constitutionalism. Especially striking was the action of Democratic League representatives in the Political Consultative Council, who walked out of the sessions at one point because police had searched the home of Huang Yen-pei, a League delegate.

U.S. POLICY IN CHINA. There is no room for doubt that the temper of the Chinese people has proved a more powerful force for civil peace than many observers anticipated. The modification of United States policy, following the resignation of Ambassador Hurley and the appointment of General

Marshall as a special envoy to China, has also been of great value in halting recent civil strife—so much so that one is led to wonder whether the agreement of January 31 might not have been reached on several other occasions—for example, in the fall of 1944 when the Japanese were approaching Kweiyang or during the conversations between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communist leader, Mao Tse-tung, last autumn in Chungking. Although it is good to know that our influence has played an important part in bringing about Chinese unity, it is also sobering to realize that this unity might have existed six months or a year ago, if some of the features of our current policy toward China had developed earlier.

From the American point of view, one of the great advantages of the unity agreement is that it enables the United States to escape the danger of backing one side against another in China, and lessens the threat of our becoming embroiled with the Russians in that part of the world. There is, of course, no guarantee that the agreement will work, and it certainly is not realistic to suppose that China's parties can avoid engaging in the sharpest kind of political competition in the years ahead. What is of concern to the Chinese people and the rest of us is that this competition be carried on by peaceful, not warlike, methods. We can make a continuing contribution in that direction by maintaining and developing the middle ground policy toward which we have recently moved in China, while extending economic aid for that country's long-term reconstruction.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

LATIN AMERICA WANTS U.S. ECONOMIC AID—FEARS INTERVENTION

A remark casually dropped by Presidential candidate Juan Perón to an American newspaperman on January 30 contained the third important accusation of United States interference with the processes of government in Latin American countries to be made in recent months. Perón's statement linking the United States Embassy in Buenos Aires with the smuggling of arms to the Argentine opposition was only slightly less direct than that of the Mexican labor leader, Vicente Lombardo Toledano, who on December 16 accused United States business interests of running guns across the border to supporters of Presidential candidate Ezequiel Padilla. In Brazil—also just before national elections were to be held—Ambassador Adolf Berle's September 29 speech, urging that elections be held as scheduled before the drafting of a new constitution, was considered responsible by some sectors of Leftist opinion for the military coup which overturned Vargas. The content of these charges is not important. The charges themselves are significant, however, because they prove that a deep-seated suspicion of the United States still exists in greater or less degree throughout Latin America. It is still good campaign tactics to

raise the cry of "Yankee imperialism," and politically unwise for a rising Latin American statesman to become too closely identified with Washington policies. The mere fact that Perón made such an accusation—regardless of its truth or falsity—is evidence of the extent to which this country, in spite of its well-intentioned attempts to adhere to a strict policy of nonintervention, influences political developments below the border.

THE "A.B.C." COUNTRIES. It is not surprising that the Central American and Caribbean countries should accuse the United States of undue influence in their internal affairs. That similar resentment has been voiced in Argentina and Brazil, and is latent in Chile, is an understandable corollary of the new preponderant role of the United States in the southern part of the continent. Brazil and Chile have not yet perhaps grasped the full implications of the changes the war effected in their economies and, as a matter of fact, may not be convinced that these changes require a permanent reorientation of their foreign commerce, which before the war was divided between Europe and the United States. These countries are eager to invite United States capital and technical

services to assist in their programs of industrialization but fearful of the extent to which such assistance may mean an abridgement of their political independence. This familiar dilemma of the Latin American countries is sharpened by the temporary absence of a counterpoise to United States economic influence in the shape of European competition.

Chile's economic problem is particularly delicate at present because of the prevailing tendency to carry economic issues into the political arena, where lack of a strong moderating influence between the extreme Right and Left impedes a stable settlement. Chile provides one of the most spectacular instances in Latin American economic history of dependence on one or two exports—namely, nitrates and copper. This situation promises to continue into the post-war period, for there are indications that the government is relying on export taxes partially to finance the loans extended by the United States for the development of new industries. The Export-Import Bank has made available a credit of \$5 million toward a public works program and \$28 million toward the purchase of United States materials and services for a new steel plant at Concepción. While Washington, in consideration of Chile's dependence on copper exports, is continuing purchases on a reduced scale, the permanent outlook for the copper market is uncertain. Even less clear is the future of Chilean nitrates, although during the next two or three years Chile is assured of a European market for all the fertilizer it can produce.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS BREED UNREST.

The current wave of strikes, accompanied by violence, in the nitrate, copper and coal industries reflects prevailing economic insecurity and, particularly, the skyrocketing cost of living. In dealing harshly with the Chilean Confederation of Labor, which on January 29 called a general sympathy strike with the nitrate unions, the administration has lost the support of the "Democratic Alliance" of Leftist parties—successor to the old Popular Front. The moderate Radical party, to which both President Ríos and Acting President Alfredo Duhalde belong, announced on February 1 that under present conditions it would refuse to cooperate with the government. A new government was formed on February 2 with the participation of the Socialists. The crisis has, however, precipitated a split between the Socialist and Communist factions in the Confederation of Labor and, as a consequence, the proposed general strike failed.

This situation has also exacerbated the sharp

political division, chiefly on the question of national financial policy, between the Right and the Left. Unless the economic problem is constructively met, the possibility of a coup from either extreme must not be ruled out. In view of the Conservative gains in the Congressional elections of 1945 and the advocacy by some Conservative spokesmen of closer political and economic relations with Argentina, it would not be surprising if the parties of the Right were to join forces with Chile's young nationalists and with those elements in the army which are in intimate contact with the Argentine "colonels'" government. It would not be the first time that a military dictatorship had followed in the wake of economic depression in Chile.

In Brazil, where a new administration headed by General Eurico Gaspar Dutra took office on January 31—the first such inauguration in twenty years—a fresh start toward solving economic and social problems is being made under auspices that may prove as uncertain as in Chile. However, at least the peoples of Brazil and Chile are able to make their opinion known through the medium of free institutions and popular elections. This cannot be said of Argentina, where the national elections scheduled for February 24, if held, threaten to be a mockery of the democratic process.


Viewed in proper perspective, however, the apparent failure in Latin American nations of democratic institutions as we know them in the United States need not be discouraging. Nor must the United States refrain from using its undeniable influence for the encouragement of democracy because the charge of intervention may be brought against it. If it is true that democracy cannot be imposed from the outside—and there are no indications that the United States proposes to do anything of this kind—it is also true that political, economic and cultural conditions which foster democracy remain to be achieved throughout Latin America. These nations should feel free to call on the United States, as the most advanced American power, to help them in creating the kind of environment in which democracy could develop.

OLIVE HOLMES

The Netherlands Indies and Japan—Battle on Paper, 1940-1941, by Hubertus J. van Mook. New York, Norton, 1944. \$2.00

A prominent Dutch colonial administrator defends the Dutch against charges that they failed to do what they could to defend the Netherlands Indies against Japan. The official texts of documents illustrative of Japanese attempts at commercial infiltration of the Indies add to the value of the book.

Washington News Letter



ATOMIC SCIENTISTS OPPOSE POLICY OF SECRECY ON BOMB

In a letter of February 2 to Senator McMahon of Connecticut, chairman of the Senate's Committee on Atomic Energy, President Truman expressed himself in favor of entrusting monopoly control of atomic energy to an exclusively civilian board, as proposed in the McMahon bill (S.1717) for the domestic control and development of atomic energy. He suggested, however, that the board be composed of three, instead of five, members.

Meanwhile, secrecy remains our policy while the Administration and Congress study the treatment of the bomb that would contribute most to general peace and our own security. This secrecy has two aspects. The Army keeps atomic data from United States scientists by "compartmentalization," which means that scientists attached to one branch of bomb-development work do not obtain the knowledge of those attached to other branches. And the United States government keeps the data secret from other nations. After the Navy announced, on January 24, that tests of the effect of the bomb on naval vessels would begin in May, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes told his press conference on January 29 that he and President Truman had agreed that the governments represented on the United Nations Commission on Atomic Control should be invited to send observers. The House Naval Affairs Committee, however, voted on January 30 to forbid the War and Navy Departments to disclose any data on the tests that would be "prejudicial" to United States interests.

SCIENTISTS IN POLITICS. What we eventually decide about secrecy concerning the atomic bomb will depend on the recommendations of both the United Nations Commission, established on January 24, which has no power to force us to yield the secret, and the special Senate Committee on Atomic Energy, which resumed its hearings on January 16. Many of the physicists, doctors of medicine, engineers and other scientists who had a hand in the making of the bomb are fearful of the possible earth-shattering consequences of their own work, and have turned their attention to politics by presenting their views to the Senate Committee. To strengthen their influence as politicians, a number of them on December 18 founded the Federation of Atomic Scientists, whose opinions and findings are publicized through another group—the National Committee on Atomic Information. Both organizations have their headquarters in Washington.

The international concern of the members of the

Federation was voiced on January 26 by Dr. Harold C. Urey, physicist of the University of Chicago, who told the Women's Patriotic Conference on National Defense in Washington that continued production of the bomb by the United States is one of the most serious obstacles to world cooperation because it breeds fear instead of the confidence required for an atmosphere of peace. Scientists in agreement with Urey advocate the establishment of a world government as the one means of preventing the disruption of civilization by the bomb they have devised. Wisely refraining from deprecating the usefulness of the United Nations, these politically minded scientists contend that, unless the world governs itself as a whole, it may destroy itself. Yet proposals for world government, or even for some reduction of national sovereignty, meet with so much resistance both here and abroad that they cannot be regarded as immediately practicable.

The Senate Committee has asked the Federation of Atomic Scientists to prepare statements on two political problems growing out of the invention of the bomb—the technical feasibility of international control of atomic energy, and the steps the Federation thinks should be taken to hasten adoption of international controls. The January 10 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists of Chicago, reporting on the activities of the Federation, commented that "the longer the setting up and operation of an [international] inspection system is delayed, the more difficult it becomes to make the system effective."

DISAGREEMENT OVER SECRECY. The Atomic Scientists of Chicago also said that the maintenance of compartmental secrecy "prevents an integrated study of the technical feasibility of inspection." One cabinet officer, Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace, has openly opposed secrecy. On January 31 he told the Senate Committee: "We must insist on following the fundamental precepts of scientific freedom—and avoid secrecy, suppression or compartmentalization of knowledge." The men in charge of the Manhattan Project, which produced the bomb, are reluctant to release all available information among scientists until after security is assured. Still other scientists see security for all in the very existence of the bomb. On December 3, 1945 Dr. Vannevar Bush, director of the Office of Scientific Research of the Federal government, said: "I think the coming of the atomic bomb will stop great wars."

BLAIR BOLLES